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HEIDEGGER’S READING OF ARISTOTLE’S CONCEPT OF PATHOS  
Abstract 
This paper takes as its point of departure the recent publication of Heidegger’s lecture 
course Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy and focuses upon Heidegger’s reading 
of Aristotle’s concept of pathos. Through a comparative analysis of Aristotle’s concept of 
pathos and Heidegger’s inventive reading of this concept, I aim to show the strengths and 
weaknesses of Heidegger’s reading. It is my thesis that Heidegger’s account is extremely 
rich and innovative as he frees up pathos from the narrow confines of psychology and 
incidental change and places it squarely into the center of the fundamental changes 
affecting a living being’s existence; simultaneously, however, Heidegger sometimes 
overstates the ties that pathos has with other concepts such as ousia and logos and 
highlights exceptional rather than common meanings of pathos, thereby risking the 
charge of being unfaithful to Aristotle’s text. 
 
 
Introduction  
Aristotle’s general influence on Heidegger has been widely acknowledged, 
certainly by the Meister himself, who once told his students that “[i]t is advisable, 
therefore, that you postpone reading Nietzsche for the time being, and first study 
Aristotle for ten to fifteen years.”1 And with the publication of Heidegger’s early lecture 
courses in the past fifteen to twenty years, we have received deeper insight into the 
particular “Aristotelian bases” 2 to Heidegger’s thinking. Still yet another aspect of this 
Aristotelian basis has been unveiled through the publication, in 2002, of Heidegger’s 
1924 summer lecture course held in Marburg entitled Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen 
Philosophie (GDAP) – i.e. “Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy,” of which an 
English translation just appeared.3 This work discusses, among other things, Aristotle’s 
concept of pathos,4 which is the precursor for Heidegger’s later concepts of attunement 
(Stimmung) 5 and disposedness (Befindlichkeit) 6 so central to Heidegger’s Being and 
Time.  
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This paper finds its point of departure in the recent publication of the Basic 
Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy and analyzes Heidegger’s discussion of Aristotle’s 
concept of pathos. Although various publications have appeared that focus upon 
particularly one part of this discussion in GDAP,7 namely Heidegger’s interpretation of 
pathos in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, as of yet no study has been undertaken that seeks to 
compare and contrast Heidegger’s comprehensive account of Aristotle’s concept of 
pathos in GDAP with the meanings of pathos in Aristotle’s oeuvre. It is my thesis that 
Heidegger’s account is extremely rich and innovative as he frees up pathos from the 
narrow confines of psychology and incidental change and places it squarely into the 
center of the fundamental changes affecting a living being’s existence; simultaneously, 
however, Heidegger sometimes overstates the ties that pathos has with other concepts 
such as ousia and logos and highlights exceptional rather than common meanings of 
pathos, thereby risking the charge of being unfaithful to Aristotle’s text.  
While it is important to understand that Aristotle’s concept of pathos informs 
Heidegger’s later concept of attunement (Stimmung) and disposedness (Befindlichkeit), it 
lays outside the scope of this article to discuss this particular development, as my main 
task here is to clarify Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle, which is already a significantly 
challenging project considering the difficulty and density of Heidegger’s text. Thus, this 
essay hopes to offer a helpful comparative analysis in conjunction with the recent 
publication and translation of Heidegger’s lecture course, and it aims at offering an 
evaluation of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s concept of pathos.  
We shall begin by giving an overview of the five main senses of pathos as they 
are found across Aristotle’s corpus. We will subsequently give an overview of 
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Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s concept of pathos, which is followed by an assessment 
of the strengths and weaknesses of Heidegger’s reading.  
 
1. The five main senses of pathos in Aristotle’s corpus  
The concept of pathos emerges across Aristotle’s entire oeuvre, in his physics, 
metaphysics, rhetoric, psychology, and ethics. Within these works, pathos shows up with 
a wide variety of meanings, such as changeable quality, illness, emotion, and excruciating 
suffering. This spectrum of meanings within Aristotle’s works becomes even larger if we 
also take into consideration related nouns such as pathēma and pathēsis, and related 
predicates such as pathētikos. It is exactly this wide spectrum of meanings of pathos and 
its related terms that has made it difficult to provide a comprehensive overview.  
 Bonitz’s Index Aristotelicus8 provides a critical starting-point for assessing the 
various uses of the concept of pathos in Aristotle.9 Bonitz classifies pathos into five 
major spheres of meaning. He shows pivotal distinctions between these five different 
senses, while also granting correlations between them. It is important to discuss Bonitz’s 
classification here, since it allows for a helpful comparison with Heidegger’s reading of 
pathos. We will list Bonitz’s account of the five senses of pathos below, and we will 
return to their overlap following this overview.  
(1) Bonitz first lists pathos as the ergon – the work or effect – of the process of 
being acted upon (paschein), 10 i.e., of what is being done and what something is 
undergoing. This sense explicitly connects pathos with the concept of paschein, which is 
one of the categories signifying passive motion, i.e., “being acted upon”; notably, 
paschein’s antonym is the concept of poiein, which signifies active motion or “acting.” In 
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this first sense, pathos signifies the product in which the process of being acted upon 
(paschein) finds its completion. For instance, in Physics III.3, Aristotle discusses how the 
(passive) process of being taught finds its end in the effect (pathos) of acquiring 
knowledge (Physics III.3, 202a21-202b22).  
(2) The second sense of pathos emerges in connection with the metaphysical 
concept of the hypokeimenon, the underlying substrate.11 In this connotation, pathos 
acquires the significance of attribute – so much so that at times it is used as a synonym 
for the term “attribute” (symbebēkos), as, for example, in DA I.1, 402a8-9, where 
Aristotle distinguishes the soul’s nature and ousia from its incidental attributes or pathē. 
Similarly, in the Metaphysics, Aristotle distinguishes musical or pale as affections or 
attributes (pathē) that are to be distinguished from the underlying subject who acquires or 
loses these affections or attributes (Metaphysics IX.7).  
(3) Thirdly, pathos acquires meaning with respect to quality, and more 
particularly, qualitative change (alloiōsis).12 Here, pathos signifies that quality which is 
currently changing, or which is changeable. For instance, the coldness of a stone is a 
pathos since it is able to be changed to its opposite, namely warmth, through heat.   
(4) Fourthly, misfortunes and pains of considerable magnitude are also called 
pathē (Metaphysics V.21, 1022b15-22).13 The harmful changes with which pathos is 
associated in this sense refer to the misfortunes and pains that happen “on a large 
scale,”14 such as those portrayed in Greek tragedy. The pathē referred to here are not just 
any sufferings, rather, they are “great afflictions”15 that are overwhelming and entirely 
out of proportion, such as being deprived of one’s children.16  
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(5) In Bonitz’s fifth and final listing, pathos is taken as affection or upheaval of 
the soul (animi perturbatio).17 In this last rendition, pathos should be understood as 
(painful or pleasurable) affect or emotion of the soul. It is in this connotation that 
Aristotle speaks in the Rhetoric about the pathē as “all those sources of change on 
account of which people differ in their judgments that are accompanied by pain and 
pleasure” (Rhetoric II.1, 1378a20-21).18  
Bonitz’s overview of the different senses of pathos is an extremely helpful tool to 
assess the range and the complexity of Aristotle’s uses of pathos. His classification shows 
important distinctions between the different senses, while also granting correlations 
between them. For instance, pathos as attribute to be distinguished from an underlying 
substrate is sometimes used in the context of qualitative change (e.g. GC I.4, 319b8-13) – 
thereby allowing for interlacing of the aforementioned second and third spheres of 
meaning of pathos. Also, pathos may be used as a “passive” attribute that is to be 
distinguished from its “active” counterpart (poiēma; e.g. Metaphysics VII.3 1028b33), 
thereby evoking overlap between the spheres of meaning of pathos as effect of paschein 
and that of pathos as attribute. Finally, another instance of connection is that between 
pathos as end-product of paschein and pathos as quality: pathos sometimes emerges as 
that quality that can change or is changing under the influence of a process of being 
affected (paschein), as Categories 8, 9b33 ff. illustrates.  
 
2. Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s concept of pathos 
While Bonitz establishes overlap between some of the spheres of meaning of 
pathos for Aristotle, the virtue of Heidegger’s reading is that it aims at finding far more 
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cohesive correlations between almost all the different senses of pathos in Aristotle. 
Indeed, Heidegger connects many of the different senses of pathos in a new and inventive 
way, and establishes three “fundamental meanings” of pathos. Much more than Bonitz or 
other commentators, Heidegger shows that pathos is not an incidental concept or a mere 
“byproduct” of other concepts, such as substance (ousia) or being (to einai). Instead, 
Heidegger pulls pathos out of the (traditional) shadows and shows its intricate connection 
with the groundbreaking concepts of being, movement, disposition, embodiment, and 
logos.  
 
2.1 Pathos as way of being 
In his analysis of Aristotle’s concept of pathos, Heidegger grants it to have a wide 
variety of meanings, but he also distinguishes three “fundamental meanings” 
(Grundbedeutungen) of pathos in Aristotle. These three main senses are: (1) the 
“average, immediate” meaning of pathos as “changeable quality”; (2) a “specifically 
ontological” meaning of pathos important for the understanding of kinēsis, which 
correlates pathos with the ontological concept of being affected (paschein); and (3) a 
more “focused” or “specialized” (zugespitzte)19 meaning: that of pathos as a changeable 
quality with relevance to a definite “being-region of life” (Seinsgebiet des Lebens) – 
passion (Leidenschaft) (GDAP 167).20 In this last rendition, pathos should be understood 
as powerful (painful or pleasurable) emotion, affection, or passion.  
Compared to Bonitz’s classification, we can establish that Heidegger condenses 
Bonitz’s five spheres of meaning to three. More specifically, Heidegger omits here the 
spheres of meaning of pathos as attribute and that of pathos as misfortune or painful 
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suffering. Although pathos in the latter sense emerges further on in Heidegger’s notes,21 
it is important to bear in mind that the sense of pathos as attribute does not emerge in 
Heidegger’s notes, and we will speculate in Section 3 about the reasons for this omission.  
Furthermore, in Heidegger’s tripartite classification we can discover a particular 
hierarchical and interpretative emphasis. The important interpretive step that Heidegger 
makes is to correlate the third sense of pathos – that of a powerful emotion or passion – 
to the first and second sense of pathos. By making pathos as emotion or passion the more 
“specialized” sense that is, simultaneously, connected both to the more common or 
average sense of pathos in the domain of change, and to the “ontological” sense of pathos 
as the effect of the process of suffering or being affected, pathos as emotion finds itself 
grounded in a far broader context: by correlating pathos as emotion to physical change 
and ontology, pathos as passion or emotion leaves the narrow domain of psychology and 
is instead situated within the broader domain of life and its movements.  
Moreover, as we will see, Heidegger argues that the lively movement that pathos 
manifests is anything but incidental to who we are as living beings. Rather, pathos is to 
be regarded as one of the ways in which being comes to fruition and actuality. To argue 
for this point, Heidegger proposes a distinct reading of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 
II.5. Aristotle’s text states: 
Since there are three ginomena in the soul – emotions (pathē), capacities 
(dynameis), and dispositions (hexeis) – virtue (aretē) must be one of these (EN 
II.5, 1105b19-21).22  
 
In his analysis, Heidegger determines that the meaning of pathos is directly dependent 
upon the fact that pathos is a ginomenon in the soul. Here Heidegger reads the Greek 
verbal noun ginomenon as “that which comes into being,” thus arguing that “pathos 
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belongs to that, which becomes in the soul” (GDAP 168; my italics).23 However, it is 
questionable whether ginomenon should be translated in this way, and it may be more 
reasonable to render it in the commonest sense of “that which is,” in which case we ought 
to understand pathos as “one of the things which is in the soul.” Especially since there is 
no question here of an aorist use of the verb gignomai, which would indicate the start of 
an activity, Heidegger’s translation of pathos as that which “becomes” in the soul could 
be contested.24  
 Notwithstanding the above critique, Heidegger’s interpretation of pathos as “that 
which becomes” is a crucial stepping-stone for his interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of 
pathos, since he argues that pathos is a “way of becoming” (Weise des Werdens) of the 
soul (GDAP 168, 169). Heidegger argues that the soul, for Aristotle, determines who we 
are, and is most essentially the being (ousia) of who we are. This means that pathos is not 
just one of the ways of becoming, but one of the ways of the becoming of being (GDAP 
168; my italics). In Heidegger’s words: “Thus, being has three different ways of 
becoming: p£qh, dun£meij, ›xeij” (GDAP 168). As additional support, Heidegger 
posits that pathos is a “way of being itself” (Weise des Sein selbst), because pathos in its 
semantic dependence upon the concept of being acted upon (paschein) signifies “being in 
the sense of being-moved” (GDAP 172). Heidegger summarizes this argument by stating 
that pathos is a “being-concept” (Seinsbegriff) (GDAP 172).  
 By establishing that pathos does not just signify any movement, but is rather to be 
designated as an essential movement of being, Heidegger frees up pathos from the 
narrow confines of incidental change, and places it squarely into the center of the 
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fundamental changes affecting a living being’s existence. The following section will 
discuss further what kind of movement pathos signifies for Heidegger.  
 
2.2 Pathos as movement  
As we saw in the preceding, the axis around which Heidegger’s notion of pathos 
turns is his interpretation of pathos as movement. To clarify this specific kind of motion, 
Heidegger quotes Aristotle’s definition of pathos in Metaphysics V.21, where pathos is 
defined in the following way:  
Pathos means in one sense a quality (poiotēs) in virtue of which a thing can be 
altered (alloiousthai), such as white and black, or sweet and bitter, or heaviness 
and lightness, or whatever else is of this sort. And in another sense it means the 
actualizations (energeiai) and the alterations (alloiōseis) of these. Of the latter, it 
implies especially harmful alterations and motions (blaberai alloiōseis kai 
kinēseis), and of these most of all those which are painful. Also, misfortunes and 
pains of considerable magnitude are called pathē (Metaphysics V.21, 1022b15-
22).25  
 
In his reading, Heidegger gives a schematic outline of the four senses of pathos that can 
be distinguished in this passage (GDAP 194-196).26 (1) With regard to the first sense, that 
of pathos as potentially changeable quality, Heidegger indicates that this is the “broadest 
and plainest” meaning. Here, pathos characterizes the vulnerability of a being: the fact 
that something can be affected (betroffen) by something. There is the possibility that 
something may happen (passieren) to me (GDAP 194/5). (2) Pathos may also signify the 
actual change of quality. Here, Heidegger reads energeia as being-there (Dasein), thus 
writing that such pathos is the “being-there of such a shifting occurring-to-one” 
(umschlagenden Mit-einem-Geschehen; GDAP 195).27 (3) In the third connotation of 
pathos as harmful change, we find, according to Heidegger, an even narrower meaning, 
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namely “that which happens to me, is harmful (abträglich) to me in its happening” 
(GDAP 195). In addition, Heidegger notes that pathos is also painful insofar as one’s 
attunement (Stimmung) is affected through this happening. (4) In its fourth sense, pathos 
designates the ‘size’ or the ‘measure’ (Ausmaß) of that which happens to one. Heidegger 
characterizes pathos in this connotation through the expression “That is a blow (Schlag) 
to me” (GDAP 195).28  
The changeable nature of pathos that emerges in Aristotle’s texts – ranging from 
potential, neutral changes to life-altering, dramatic events – reveal, according to 
Heidegger, the “genuine relatedness of pathos” (GDAP 195): the fact that pathos is 
always related to the being of living things (das Sein des Lebenden; Heidegger’s italics), 
and particularly to their being disposed in a certain way (Je-und-je-sich-so-Befinden) 
(GDAP 195). According to Heidegger, pathos befalls one and strikes one into (schlägt 
einen in) this disposedness (Befindlichkeit).  
By emphasizing the relationship between pathos as lively movement and its 
underlying disposedness, Heidegger takes a clear stance in his reading of pathos. Instead 
of seeing pathos as an isolated event to be observed in abstraction from the being that 
undergoes such pathos, Heidegger draws the change together with the condition of the 
being that undergoes such change. In this manner, Heidegger seeks to highlight a crucial 
issue that may be easily overlooked: that of the relationship between the affects that a 
being undergoes and the underlying disposition that makes those affects possible, either 
in an obstructing or in a facilitating way. For this reason, Heidegger writes that “pathos is 
not a turning around or changing that has its course set for itself, but a mode of being 
disposed (Sichbefinden) in the world that, at the same time, stands in a possible relation 
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to hexis” (GDAP 171). In this regard, Heidegger makes clear that our dispositions are not 
to be isolated from the way the world affects us, and neither can our affections be isolated 
from our dispositions or hexeis. As Heidegger highlights, there is a fundamental 
correlation between our dispositions and our affections. Just as the pathē are 
characteristic of our entire human being and our Befindlichkeit in the world (GDAP 192), 
similarly our susceptibility or hexis can only find expression through and in the actual 
pathē with which it is connected. Thus, pathos confronts us with the fact that we are 
always already disposed in a particular way. Simultaneously, a disposition or hexis forms 
the “guiding thread” for grasping the being-structure (Seinsstruktur) of pathos” (GDAP 
191). 
Pathos constitutes a change that can be painful and destructive to the being that 
undergoes it, specifically as we saw in the fourth connotation listed by Heidegger, where 
pathos is associated with the ‘size’ or ‘measure’ of such painful events. Yet, Heidegger 
also notes that pathos does not necessarily have this destructive effect: it can also have 
the character of salvation (Retten) in the sense of the Greek soidzein – saving oneself and 
coming into oneself (GDAP 196). In support of this reading, Heidegger cites the 
discussion of being affected (paschein) in De Anima II.5, where Aristotle argues that 
there are two senses of paschein: one that implies change and thus the “destruction of 
something by its contrary” (II.5, 417b3) and the other implying the actualization of 
something. This latter sense involves “the salvation (sōteria) of that which is potential by 
something actual which is like it” (II.5, 417b4-5). It is this latter sense of sōteria that 
Heidegger wants to highlight, since it indicates that pathos in its connection with 
paschein can have a very positive meaning in contrast to the sense of destruction and pain 
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that we find in Metaphysics V.22. Pathic movement can lead to destruction, but can also 
mean the coming to fruition and full actualization of something. To illustrate, Heidegger 
gives Aristotle’s example of the builder who, by building a house, does not become 
different than what he was, but actually becomes what he is through building. It is not 
accurate to describe the builder as being “changed” through his building, rather it is more 
accurate to state that the builder fully becomes what and who he is through building. 
More precisely, it seems that through the activity, the disposition of the builder is 
preserved. As Heidegger phrases it: “the hexis is being saved (gerettet)” (GDAP 196).  
What this explanation of Aristotle’s De Anima does is show the fluency with 
which Heidegger connects the various senses of pathos and paschein. Heidegger seeks to 
complement the destructive sense of pathos in Metaphysics V.21 with the enriching sense 
of pathos as finding fulfillment and completion of one’s disposition, thereby showing 
pathos’ ambiguity: on the one hand, a process whereby one can be deprived of one’s own 
disposition (as in aging and losing particular dispositions) and, on the other hand, a 
process of sublation (Aufhebung) to a higher, authentic state of realizing oneself (GDAP 
197, cf. 242). Thus to truly ‘have pathos’ in Heidegger’s terms is the opposite of fleeing 
from one’s being. The pleasure that pathos brings consists of being opened up (Aufschluß 
haben) to one’s being-in-the-world (GDAP 247).  
 
2.3 Pathos as embodied life  
Heidegger also points out that, for Aristotle, pathos as way of the becoming of 
being is not only limited to the soul, but includes the entire human being. As Heidegger 
writes: “the originary unity of the phenomenon of the p£qh lies in the being of human 
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beings as such” (GDAP 177). To demonstrate that Aristotle himself saw the pathē as a 
unified phenomenon encompassing both body and soul, 29 Heidegger turns to De Anima 
I.1, where Aristotle states that “all pathē seem to be with (meta) a body” (DA I.1, 403a16; 
cf. GDAP 203 ff.). In Heidegger’s words, the pathē are always the pathē of a body 
(GDAP 206).  
This holistic aspect of pathos also emerges in the inclusion of pleasure and pain in 
Aristotle’s formulation in the Nicomachean Ethics that the pathē are “accompanied 
(hepetai) by pleasure or pain” (EN II.5, 1105b21-24). Thus, with each pathos that one 
experiences, one’s own personal well-being is affected, either in terms of a “higher” or 
“lower” sense of well-being, which Heidegger characterizes as a “higher-or lower-being-
attuned” (GDAP 170).30 Heidegger stresses that we should read the Greek verb hepetai as 
“accompany” instead of the common translation “follow,” since pain and pleasure do not 
“follow” the pathē, but are simultaneously present with the emergence of the pathē.31 
 Heidegger translates the pain and pleasure of which Aristotle speaks here as a 
form of being-situated or being-disposed (Befindlichkeit, Sichbefinden, GDAP 243, 244), 
since it is in pleasure and pain that our own being-in-relation is disclosed in either a 
pleasurable or a painful way. Heidegger emphasizes that since the quest for pleasure is 
given with living itself (GDAP 245), pleasure is not just a temporary phenomenon 
(GDAP 245), but fundamental to life itself. This implies that we, as living beings, can 
only be interested in particular pathē because we are fundamentally affective beings, i.e. 
situated and invested in our existence.  
With this latter designation of pleasure as being inherent to life, which makes 
pathos inherent to life, we find that Heidegger once again pulls pathos squarely into the 
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center of the living human being. Similar to his assessment of pathos as ‘way of our 
being,’ his assessment of pathos as being-disposed locates pathos in the core of our 
being, and thereby circumvents the understanding of pathos as a merely temporary 
phenomenon. In addition, Heidegger views pathos as given with life as such, and does 
not place pathos in the narrow framework of cause and effect.  
 
2.4 Pathos as basis for logos  
For his interpretation of the relationship between pathos and logos in Aristotle, 
Heidegger turns to the definition of the pathē given in Rhetoric II.1: 
The pathē are those sources of change on account of which people differ 
(metaballontes) in their judgments (kriseis) that are accompanied by pain and 
pleasure (Rhet. II.1, 1378a20-21).32 
 
In Heidegger’s reading of this passage, three things stand out. First, he again emphasizes 
that pathos is to be associated with movement or change – as expressed by the term 
metaballontes (GDAP 170). It is through the pathē that we radically change from one 
mode of being disposed (Befindlichkeit) to another. Secondly, through this change of 
mood, we take in or adopt another stance or position (Stellung), thereby reading 
Aristotle’s “judgment” in the broad sense of stance or position (GDAP 170). Thirdly, 
Heidegger emphasizes that pain or pleasure is constitutive of pathos and not just an after-
effect (GDAP 170). With regard to the second point, Heidegger reads the “change of 
judgment” that follows pathos in a broad sense, as pertaining not just to a singular, 
isolated judgment, but to our entire being positioned towards the world (GDAP 170). 
Drawing upon Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Heidegger sketches a vivid picture of a speaker 
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addressing his audience, appealing to their pathē and thereby allowing them to “take in a 
stance” towards the world (Stellungnahme zur Welt; GDAP 170).  
In Heidegger’s view, by obtaining greater clarity about the fundamental role that 
the pathē play with regard to our being positioned and directed towards the world, we 
also acquire more clarity about the “soil” or ground (Boden) for logos (GDAP 169). More 
specifically, Heidegger argues that the pathē are the fundamental possibilities according 
to which Dasein primarily orients itself about itself (GDAP 262), since the pathē “are the 
ground (Boden) out of which speaking grows (erwächst) and into which what has been 
spoken or expressed (das Ausgesprochene) grows back (wieder wächst)” (GDAP 262).33 
As an example of the fundamental role that the pathē play in the formation of speaking 
(logos), Heidegger cites Rhet. II.5, 1383a6 where Aristotle argues that people who 
become anxious approach others to deliberate and to obtain advice. He concludes that 
fear is the kind of disposition (Befindlichkeit) that brings one to speak (GDAP 261); 
especially when we are not simply fearful, but when we experience dread (Angst) and a 
sense of uncanniness (Unheimlichkeit) we begin to speak, according to Heidegger (GDAP 
261).  
The important insight that can be drawn from Heidegger’s reading is that pathos 
is not a particular isolated phenomenon occurring in one’s mind, but one that grounds us 
in a far deeper and more fundamental way, as the foundation of our own speaking – both 
the beginning of speaking, and the speaking with each other. This also implies that 
speaking or logos does not occur in isolation, but is grounded in a far-wider orientation 
originating with our affectedness. In addition, logos gains broader appeal than that of just 
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“thinking,” as Heidegger associates it with a general “attitude” or stance towards the 
world.  
   
3. The strengths and weaknesses of Heidegger’s reading  
The overall strength of Heidegger’s reading is the ease and versatility with which 
he correlates various passages on pathos in Aristotle’s corpus. By seeking connections 
between the different senses, the isolated notions of pathos (such as pathos as emotion or 
pathos as qualitative change) acquire underpinnings in a far wider Aristotelian 
metaphysical project than is usually surmised. Moreover, Heidegger expands the scope of 
meaning of pathos by showing its interconnections with fundamental concepts of 
Aristotelian ontology and physics, such as substance, soul, movement, matter, 
disposition, and logos.  
As for the strengths and weaknesses of Heidegger’s specific analyses above, we 
would do well to consider these individually:  
(1) The strengths of Heidegger’s reading of pathos as “way of being” is that it 
highlights the fact that pathos as mood or emotion finds broader metaphysical grounding 
in the concept of change and being affected (paschein), which shows that pathos is 
central to understanding the process of becoming who we are. The weakness of this 
reading, however, is that his interpretation of pathos moves extremely quickly through 
Aristotle’s concepts without showing the fundamental connections in Aristotle’s text. For 
instance, Heidegger’s conclusion that pathos is a “way of being” hinges upon the 
argument that pathos must be a way of becoming of being, since it is a movement that 
takes place in the soul, which is an ousia (GDAP 168, 169). This deduction is made too 
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swiftly though, and needs more explanation, especially since we know from Aristotle’s 
works that pathos is often not associated with the coming-into-being of a substance 
(ousia), but is used to indicate qualitative change, which is sometimes explicitly opposed 
to substantial change. 34 The fact that Heidegger overstates the relationship between ousia 
and pathos goes hand in hand with Heidegger’s failure to mention that pathos can mean 
attribute. In my view, Heidegger does not discuss this sense of pathos since it does not fit 
with his overall project of showing the important connections that pathos has with other 
fundamental concepts of Aristotelian ontology and physics.  
(2) With regard to Heidegger’s reading of pathos as movement, we can fully 
endorse the emphasis that Heidegger places on movement and being-moved as the central 
core of pathos, as this thesis finds ample proof in Aristotle’s texts. Yet, a weakness of 
this reading is Heidegger’s focus on the human being (GDAP 169, 177) as the main one 
to undergo these pathic movements. When Heidegger speaks about how painful pathos 
may affect our (human) attunements (GDAP 195), it would have been interesting to hear 
how painful pathē affect other living beings such as animals. Especially given the fact 
that we do find instances in Aristotle’s works mentioning, for instance, illness35 in 
animals (e.g. Parts of Animals III.4, 667a33-34), it would have been worthwhile to hear 
Heidegger’s take on the use of pathos in this more inclusive framework.36  
Moreover, we find Heidegger’s focus on pathos as salvation or rescue (sōteria) a 
bit skewed, especially since in Aristotle’s De Anima Aristotle leaves open the option that 
the process of actualization with which salvation is associated may not be called paschein 
properly speaking (DA II.5, 417b13-14). In addition, this instance of salvation is mostly 
discussed in DA within the context of sense-perception. The implications that Heidegger 
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draws for our general understanding of pathos as allowing us to truly become who we are 
(GDAP 196), and to be open (Aufschluß) to our own being-in-the-world (GDAP 244), 
seem to stray too far from Aristotle’s own textual context, which focuses upon the 
actualization of sense-perception. In addition, we need to note that pathos is often 
discussed within the context of very painful and destructive events (e.g. Poetics 11, 
1452b10-13). Heidegger’s emphatic reading of pleasurable and salvatory pathos seems to 
highlight an exception rather than the rule.  
(3) Heidegger’s reading of pathos as embodied life is extremely valuable, as it 
gives back to the human being that which has been overlooked in philosophy for a long 
time, namely: the body. Furthermore, if it is true that Aristotle’s notion of pathos gives 
rise to Heidegger’s notion of attunement, and if Aristotle’s notion of pathos includes that 
of embodiment, we find in Heidegger’s analysis of pathos at the same time the body of 
Dasein, which, according to critics of Heidegger, has been famously absent from his 
analyses.37  
(4) The strength of Heidegger’s analysis of pathos as the basis or ground for logos 
lies in his strategic reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, which draws attention to the 
correlation between pathos and speaking, pathos and taking a stance, and pathos and co-
deliberation with others. Yet, we can also detect a weakness in this reading, since 
Heidegger only focuses upon a few passages in Aristotle’s Rhetoric to justify his claim 
that pathos is the basis or ground for logos. The narrow focus of his reading is especially 
problematic, since we can point to numerous passages elsewhere that would contradict 
the idea that pathos is the foundation for logos. For instance, in Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics we find important textual evidence that argues that pathos can sometimes act 
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completely on its own – without any collaboration with choice (prohairesis), and thus 
without attendant logos. Again, in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle gives the example of 
a man who acts completely out of anger (V.6, 1134a21), arguing that in such a case no 
logos was involved in the man’s actions. For this reason, the person acting in such a 
manner is less culpable or perhaps not even culpable at all (cf. Nicomachean Ethics V.8, 
1135b19-27).38  
Admittedly, the passages just cited (which emphasize the possibility of a 
disconnection between pathos and logos) do not imply that a connection between the two 
is impossible. On the contrary, Aristotle argues in the Nicomachean Ethics precisely for 
the proper interaction and intertwinement of logos and our affectivity or pathos. This 
emerges particularly prominently in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle 
shows that practical wisdom or phronēsis works in close collaboration with moral virtue, 
and thus with our affectivity or pathos. Yet, one wonders whether Aristotle would 
approve of Heidegger’s claim that pathos is the ground for logos, and would not rather 
want to argue that logos and pathos necessarily complement each other. The claim that 
one would be the basis or ground (Boden) for the other may serve Heidegger’s polemic 
against rationalism nicely by arguing that attunement is more primordial than logos,39 but 
it may not work so well when viewed against an Aristotelian background. For Aristotle, 
our pathē have to be shaped through our logos, and our logos finds shape in and through 
our pathē. Put simply, for Aristotle, pathos and logos complement and co-constitute one 
another, instead of one founding the other, as Heidegger boldly claims. 
 
Conclusion  
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 Having assessed the specific strengths and weaknesses of Heidegger’s account, 
we should reach the conclusion that Heidegger’s analysis is extremely rich and 
innovative in its reading of Aristotle’s concept of pathos. For Heidegger is the one who 
puts pathos back on the “Aristotelian map” by showing the fundamental interconnections 
between the various senses of pathos as well as its connections with crucial concepts such 
as being, movement, disposition, embodiment, and logos. Indeed, Heidegger is very keen 
on showing how important affectivity is for all these strands of Aristotelian thought, and 
the recent surge of studies investigating physis, kinēsis, dynamis, and energeia40 in 
Aristotle’s works is testament to the visionary role that Heidegger has played in pursuing 
pathos and movement as central to Aristotle’s thinking.  
At the same time, this article has also shown that Heidegger’s analysis has some 
weaknesses too, insofar as it moves at times rather swiftly through Aristotle’s texts and 
fails to mention that pathos can also play a more subsidiary role in Aristotle’s universe – 
where pathos sometimes merely means attribute or incident. Moreover, at times, 
Heidegger overstates connections between pathos and other concepts, or is too invested 
in the positive aspects of pathos, which leads him to overemphasize its role as rescue or 
salvation, whereas the context of Aristotle’s works points to something far more humble 
or prosaic, such as the simple actualization of sense-perception.  
Despite the problems with Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s concept of pathos 
however, we think the strengths of Heidegger’s analysis win out over the weaknesses. 
Heidegger’s reading has opened up the dynamic, fluid world of Aristotle’s thinking of 
affectivity, and forces us to look more carefully both at Aristotle’s individual works and 
at the oeuvre as such in search for conceptual understanding and intertwining.41  
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